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Executive Summary
Employers have been using traditional trusts called VEBAs (voluntary employees’
beneficiary associations) for decades to put aside money to pay medical and other
benefits for their employees as a hedge against future payment difficulties. But as
health care costs have continued to escalate and businesses have faced growing
economic challenges, many employers are rethinking their long-term health care
promises to retirees. As part of this transformation, the traditional VEBA has taken on a
different character and a new form of VEBA has emerged: the so-called “stand-alone”
VEBA trust, through which some employers have been able to rid themselves of future
obligations to pay retiree health benefits in exchange for making a significant payment
to the VEBA designed to approximate the total projected cost of the benefits.
The purpose of this issue brief is to discuss several key questions in connection with the
current use of stand-alone VEBAs. The paper profiles three VEBAs through case
studies, draws preliminary conclusions from their early experiences, and considers the
implications and future questions raised by this approach to providing retiree medical
benefits.
The most common situations in which stand-alone VEBAs have been used in this
fashion are: (1) as part of a negotiated settlement of outstanding liabilities when the
employer is in bankruptcy; (2) as a result of collective bargaining when an employer in
financial difficulty proposes a major restructuring of its health benefit obligations as an
alternative to bankruptcy; or (3) as a method of settling a class action suit brought by
retirees, a union, or both, to block termination or modification of retiree medical benefits.
The recent interest in VEBAs among large employers is not hard to fathom. Escalation
of health care costs is clearly an important factor, but employer interest in VEBAs arises
primarily from changes in corporate accounting rules that require public companies to
adopt more prominent balance sheet disclosure of their retiree health liabilities.
For employers, VEBAs have the potential to yield an immediate two-fold benefit. Not
only can the company shed any future legal liability for paying promised benefits to
retirees, but it also can terminate any balance sheet liability attributable to those
obligations.
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For retirees, however, the consequences of such a transaction are far less certain. On
the one hand, VEBAs offer retirees a dedicated source of funding for future medical
benefits, so receipt of benefits is no longer entirely contingent on their employer’s
continued existence, financial health and good will. On the other hand, VEBAs do not
guarantee that promised benefits will be fully funded since the existence and
affordability of benefits in the future is limited to what the assets in the VEBA will
ultimately support. Moreover, to the extent that employer stock has been contributed to
the VEBA instead of or in addition to cash (as is being currently proposed for the auto
industry VEBAs), in the current troubled economic climate, the VEBA’s asset base may
be even less secure than originally projected. Although retirees may view the VEBA
alternative as merely trading one set of uncertainties for another, this new generation of
VEBAs may be the best hope some retirees have for retaining employer-sponsored
medical benefits either as primary coverage for early retirees or supplementary
coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees.
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Background
The uncertainty that many Americans feel about whether their health insurance will be
there when they need it continues to grow. Over time, it has become increasingly
apparent that those with employer-sponsored health insurance plans can lose that
coverage overnight if their job situation changes – they lose full-time status, become
disabled, are laid-off or terminated, change jobs voluntarily, or leave the workforce for
child-rearing or other caregiving reasons. Or, they may lose their coverage if their
company makes a change, for example, if it fails, is bought out by another entity, or if
the employer decides to discontinue its health plan for any reason. For spouses and
dependents whose access to health insurance flows from their relationship to the
employee, the situation is even more tenuous.
Perhaps no group of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance is more
endangered than retirees, as retiree medical coverage has sharply declined over the
past two decades.1 Although the number of employers canceling their plans seems to
have stabilized recently, substantial cost-shifting continues. According to the most
recent Kaiser/Hewitt Associates Retiree Health Survey, in 2006, 74% of employers
increased retiree premiums, 32% increased retiree drug co-payments or co-insurance,
25% increased retiree out-of-pocket limits, and 11% eliminated subsidized retiree health
benefits entirely for new hires.2 Many employers also made significant changes in the
design of their health plans for retirees, capping company contributions or moving to
account-based approaches rather than retaining the more traditional health plan
structure familiar to most retirees.3
Unquestionably this trend toward eroding retiree medical coverage has been driven in
large part by the escalating costs faced by employers that voluntarily provide health
benefits and the challenge of global competition.
But equally important in
understanding these downward trends for retirees is the effect that the changes in
corporate accounting treatment for retiree benefits that have been imposed since 1990
have had on employers’ willingness and ability to continue to provide the benefits that
retirees were promised and fully expected to receive. Particularly for employers now
facing global competitors that do not have these ongoing fiscal responsibilities to
retirees, the pressures to reduce their so-called “legacy costs” have been enormous.
Unfortunately some employers have chosen to respond to these pressures in ways that
have resulted in severe financial hardship and cutbacks in access to health insurance
for retirees facing medical crises.4
Recently an interesting approach in the evolution of retiree medical benefits has
emerged: the use of stand-alone tax-favored trusts (voluntary employees’ beneficiary
associations or VEBAs) as mechanisms to transition responsibility for paying those
ongoing benefits from employer-sponsored retiree benefit plans to independent private
sector tax-exempt entities.
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The purpose of this issue brief is to discuss several key questions in connection with the
current use of stand-alone VEBAs, to profile three recent VEBAs through case studies,
and to consider the implications and future questions raised by this new approach to
providing retiree medical benefits.

What is a VEBA?
A voluntary employees’ beneficiary association or VEBA is a tax-exempt organization
that can be used as a funding vehicle for retiree medical and certain other types of
benefits. Eligible for tax-exempt treatment under Section 501(c)(9) of the Internal
Revenue Code, VEBAs usually are set up as trusts, but they can also be organized as
corporations or associations. VEBAs can be used to pay life, sickness, accident and
similar benefits to members of the association and their dependents, if the VEBA meets
certain specified requirements under the Code.
For instance, a VEBA must be a voluntary association of employees or former
employees who have an employment-related common bond. This bond can be
demonstrated by connection among members through an employer or former employer,
coverage under one or more collective bargaining agreements, or membership in a
labor union or one or more locals of a national or international union. According to the
IRS, during fiscal year 2007, more than 12,000 tax returns were filed on behalf of
VEBAs, although there is no way to determine with certainty what types of benefits were
provided under these trusts.5 Nor is there a way to determine how many of them are
stand-alone VEBAs not established or maintained by employers as a mechanism to
fund their ongoing health care plans.
First introduced into the tax law in 1928,6 VEBAs can be established by employers or by
groups of employees, but they must be controlled by their members or by an
independent trustee or trustees, at least some of whom are designated by the
members. Funds held by the VEBA and earnings on those assets are not taxable, but
the benefits paid may or may not be taxable to the recipient, depending on the type of
benefits.
Unlike pension plans, which under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) are required to be funded in advance, health benefits are ordinarily
payable from the general assets of the employer since, except when health benefits are
collectively bargained, the tax code prohibits prefunding. Although employer
contributions to a VEBA for current health benefits are deductible, the significant
limitations on deductibility of employer contributions for future health benefits have been
the primary reason that VEBAs are not more widely used by employers. The main
problem is that the annual deductible for plan sponsors is limited to the expected
amount necessary to fund that year’s incurred but unpaid claims, plus administrative
expenses.7 So any attempt by employers to set aside money in advance on a taxfavored basis to pay future health benefits is likely to be prohibited.
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But there are two important exceptions to these limits. When contributions to a health
plan are made pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, they are fully deductible
when made to a VEBA.8 In addition, a full deduction can be taken for annual
contributions made on behalf of employees (whether or not unionized) to fund a
reserve, as long as (1) the reserve is funded over the working lives of the covered
employees and (2) the annual contributions necessary to fund post-retirement medical
or life insurance benefits are actuarially determined on a level basis.9 Not surprisingly,
given these restrictions, VEBAs designed to pay ongoing health benefits for active and
retired workers are typically more likely to be found in industries where benefits are
collectively bargained.10
In addition to tax code requirements, VEBAs may also be subject to other legal
requirements depending on how they are established and what benefits are provided
through this funding vehicle. For instance, when the VEBA is collectively bargained, the
federal Taft-Hartley requirements may apply.11 In addition, many VEBAs are “employee
welfare benefit plans” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) and therefore subject to the ERISA rules12 as well as the tax code
requirements. Fully insured VEBAs may also be indirectly subject to state law as well.

How Are VEBAs Used?
In most cases, VEBAs have been used by employers to segregate assets to pay
ongoing health benefits for active workers or retirees from the company’s general
assets. The employer retains control over the funding and administration of the VEBA
because it is used simply as a funding vehicle for the employer-sponsored plan.
“Stand-alone VEBAs” differ from traditional VEBAs in that they are generally designed
to operate somewhat or fully independently of the employer for whom the retirees
performed services when they were active employees. This new generation of VEBAs
has been established most frequently as part of a negotiated settlement of outstanding
liabilities when the employer is in bankruptcy, as a result of collective bargaining when
an employer in financial difficulty proposes a major restructuring of its health benefit
obligations as an alternative to bankruptcy, or as a method of settling a class action suit
brought by retirees, a union, or both to block termination or modification of their retiree
medical benefits.
Bankruptcy
Historically, most stand-alone VEBAs have been an outgrowth of employer
bankruptcies. According to a 2007 survey of 25 retiree health VEBAs conducted by the
Segal Company, more than half of these VEBAs were created as a result of bankruptcy
– ten were formed in bankruptcy with an additional seven resulting from collective
bargaining in bankruptcy.13
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Federal bankruptcy law allows employers to terminate or modify their existing health
benefit programs for active employees even if that would violate an existing collective
bargaining agreement, as long as the bankruptcy court approves.14
A separate
procedure allows employers in bankruptcy to negotiate modifications of retiree health
For instance, the debtor cannot unilaterally terminate or modify the
obligations.15
retiree medical plan after the bankruptcy filing. Instead, the bankruptcy court will
appoint a committee of retirees to negotiate with the debtor. The debtor proposes
modifications “necessary to permit reorganization” of the company and then must
negotiate with the retiree committee. If no agreement is reached, the court can order
modification of the plan, but the retirees are entitled to a “general unsecured claim” in
bankruptcy for the value of the benefits that have been eliminated. This type of a claim
puts the retirees at the end of the line after other higher priority creditors in bankruptcy.
As a practical matter, this means that the retirees will get little or nothing to compensate
them for their loss. As an alternative, retirees sometimes agree to allow the employer to
set up a stand-alone VEBA and contribute a specified sum to settle the retiree claims in
bankruptcy.
Companies that have established stand-alone VEBAs as a result of recent settlements
of retiree obligations in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations include Dana
Corporation, 16 based in Toledo, Ohio, which agreed to set up three VEBAs – one for
the salaried retirees and two for the hourly retiree employees, one for those represented
by the Autoworkers union and another for those represented by the Steelworkers
union.17 (See Case Study #1) Tower Automotive also promised to make a series of cash
payments to three different VEBAs, each negotiated with the respective unions
representing separate groups of retirees.18..
Collective Bargaining Outside of Bankruptcy
The United Auto Workers and the Big Three automobile companies (General Motors,
Ford and Chrysler) have been in the news lately because they have recently negotiated
additional and much larger VEBAs to supplement the existing VEBAs that were
negotiated in 2005 with GM and Ford19 and approved by the courts in 2006.
The 2005 VEBAs were designed to mitigate some of the new out-of-pocket costs for
retirees that resulted under the new more modest retiree medical plan negotiated with
the union for which GM had agreed to retain liability for providing retiree benefits in that
round of collective bargaining.20 A similar arrangement was negotiated with Ford.21 In
the 2005 round of bargaining, the auto companies agreed to continue their retiree
medical plans but were allowed to drop dental coverage and, for the first time, impose
certain co-payments and deductibles. The 2005 VEBAs were designed to assist
retirees in offsetting these reductions in coverage. In exchange for this modification in
coverage for retirees, the companies agreed to contribute to the VEBA. Employer
contributions are also supplemented with contributions by active workers, primarily
wage and cost-of-living adjustment deferrals. Both the GM and Ford 2005 VEBAs are
governed by boards of trustees independent of the company.
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To fund its part of the 2005 VEBA, GM agreed to contribute a minimum of $3 billion: $1
billion in 2006, $1 billion in 2007 and $1 billion in 2011 (or earlier if the assets fall below
a specified amount).22 Additional cash contributions based on the increase in value of
certain GM stock were also required.23
To fund its 2005 VEBA, Ford agreed to contribute $108 million over several years, with
an acceleration clause if the balance in the VEBA falls below a certain level.24 Additional
Ford contributions based on appreciation of certain Ford stock were also required.25
In contrast, the agreement negotiated in the fall of 2007 between the UAW and all three
auto companies allows the firms to transfer their retiree health liabilities to a new standalone VEBA. A single administrative structure has been created with a single VEBA
Board of Trustees, but each of the retiree auto company groups will have its own
separate plan and separate subaccount within the VEBA trust.26 The total funding
agreed to by the three companies is $56.4 billion27 and an independent board will
oversee the VEBAs. How these negotiated funding arrangements will be affected by the
recent financial loan plan for the auto companies approved by the Bush Administration
in December, 2008 remains to be seen.28 (See Case Study # 2.)
Settlement of Retiree Class Action Litigation
To the extent they have reserved the right to do so in their plan documents using socalled “reservation of rights clauses,” employers generally believe they have the legal
right to terminate or modify their retiree health promises at any time since ERISA’s
statutory vesting rules only apply to pension plans.29 In evaluating this claim by
employers, a court will determine whether there is any non-statutory basis for finding
that the benefits have “vested.” In asserting a vesting claim for retiree health benefits,
non-union or management retirees typically fare worse in the courts than union retirees,
since most courts that have found the retirees have a vested right to health benefits
have done so on the basis of enforcing the terms of a contractual agreement that
confers vested status on retirees.30
Nevertheless, when an employer announces plans to terminate or modify its retiree
health plan, retirees often threaten to file a class action lawsuit to prevent this action.
On the one hand, the employer asserts its legal right to change or eliminate the plan
based on the reservation of rights clause; on the other hand, retirees assert they have a
legal right to lifetime benefits because they were promised that if they worked until
retirement, they were guaranteed health benefits for life. The retirees argue that they
have fulfilled their part of the bargain and now the employer must keep its word. When
the employer moves forward to implement its decision, retirees may file suit, often
joined by the union.31
In a number of cases, settlement of the ensuing class action lawsuit has involved the
establishment of a stand-alone VEBA, with an agreement on the part of the employer to
contribute a fixed cash amount (in one or more payments) to fund the VEBA
(sometimes supplemented with a contribution of employer stock) which will then take
over the job of providing retiree medical benefits. In essence, the employer is able to
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strike a deal offloading some or all of its future retiree benefit liability in exchange for
making a lump sum contribution to a trust dedicated solely to pay for benefits that are
completely divorced from the employer’s management and control. If a union is also
involved in the class action lawsuit, the settlement agreement usually contains
provisions specifying that the union agrees not to bargain over retiree benefits in the
future. Often the settlement agreement will also provide that active workers may agree
to defer some or all of future wage increases or cost-of-living adjustments as an
additional funding stream for the VEBA.
Recent examples of this approach include the settlement agreement between Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., a class of Steelworker retirees, and the United Steelworkers
Union32 and the settlement agreement approved in early 2008 between the AK Steel
Company and a class of retirees who had worked in the company’s Middletown, Ohio
facility under collective bargaining agreements between the company and the Armco
Employees Independent Federation, Inc. (AEIF).33 (See Case Study #3).

What is Driving the Recent VEBA Activity?
Employer Considerations
The recent interest in VEBAs among large employers is not hard to fathom. Although
continuing escalation of health care costs is important, employer interest in VEBAs
arises primarily from the marketplace effect on these employers that has occurred as a
result of changes in corporate accounting rules forcing public companies to adopt more
prominent balance sheet disclosure of the existence and magnitude of their retiree
health liabilities.
In 1990, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) released an accounting
standard (FAS 106) that changed the way that publicly held companies were required to
account for future costs of other post-employment benefits (OPEB), including retiree
health and life insurance. Established in 1974, FASB is the private sector organization
to which the Securities and Exchange Commission has delegated standard-setting
authority for financial accounting and reporting. What the FASB decreed was that for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992, public companies could no longer bury
their retiree medical liabilities in the footnotes of their financial disclosure forms or report
their obligations on a pay-as-you go basis. Instead, these companies would have to
report an accrued liability on their financial statements equal to the value of their OPEB
liability, a measure designed to acknowledge these costs in a more tangible way. The
employer’s OPEB liability could be offset on the balance sheet with any existing assets
that had been segregated to defray those liabilities.34
Minimizing their accounting liabilities or moving retiree health liabilities off their balance
sheets entirely is a major concern for these employers. For instance, the Big Three auto
companies reportedly had a combined projected retiree medical liabilities total of $100
billion in 2006 and the companies claim that providing health insurance for active
employees and retirees adds about $1,500 to the cost of each car they sell.35
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From an employer point of view, establishing a stand-alone VEBA and negotiating with
the union and/or retirees to transfer future retiree medical liabilities to the VEBA in
exchange for a specified cash contribution (usually calculated with relation to the
employer’s reported OPEB accounting liability) provides a number of significant
advantages.
Perhaps the most significant advantage is that not only can the employer eliminate a
significant ongoing cash flow obligation, but the employer is also able to erase its
balance sheet accounting liability for the retiree benefits. To the extent that the cash
contribution made to a VEBA satisfying the employer’s future obligations to provide
retiree medical benefits can be construed under the accounting rules to be a
“settlement” or elimination of the employer’s OPEB for the benefits, the employer gains
an immediate and often substantial improvement in its balance sheet position. This
clearly will be a big advantage for the employer with current shareholders and potential
investors. Moreover, the employer also gains because it is able to eliminate future
potential legal and public relations problems it might have faced for any subsequent
modifications or reductions in retiree medical benefits it might have adopted.
The primary downside consideration for employers contemplating the negotiation and
establishment of a stand-alone VEBA is the often lengthy and complicated process that
ensues even after the negotiations setting the terms for the VEBA are successfully
concluded.
Various judicial and government approvals will be necessary. If a settlement agreement
has to be approved by a court, affected participants and/or class members will have to
be notified and given an opportunity to object to the settlement in writing. The judge will
also conduct a “Fairness Hearing” in which class members other than the named
plaintiffs will be able to testify in support of or in opposition to the proposed settlement
agreement.
After listening to all the evidence and reviewing the proposed settlement agreement, the
judge will have to determine whether the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable and
adequate and, in doing so, will have to make findings on the record about several
important factors. In the AK Steel case, for instance, the judge considered a number of
things, including (1) the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits; (2) the
complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation if the case was tried, (3) the
opinions of class counsel and class representatives, (4) the reaction of absent class
members, and (5) the public interest.36
The time that elapses between the signing of the proposed settlement agreement and
its final approval can vary considerably. In the Goodyear case, the settlement
agreement was signed by the parties on October 29, 2007, the Fairness Hearing was
held on April 17, 2008 and the settlement agreement was finally approved by the district
court on August 22, 2008, but only after the court had requested additional briefing and
arguments focusing in part on the reliability of the actuarial projections of how long the
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assets contributed by Goodyear were expected to last to pay benefits. On the other
hand, in the AK Steel case, the settlement agreement was signed in October, 2007 and
the court gave final approval to the settlement on February 21, 2008.
Further delay can occur if the agreed upon employer contribution to the VEBA includes
employer stock or other employer securities, since both ERISA and the tax code prohibit
this type of a transaction unless certain conditions are met.37 Thus the VEBA will have
to seek an administrative exemption from ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules from the
U.S. Department of Labor in order to acquire and hold the stock.38
In the end, the clear winner when a stand-alone VEBA is established to pay future
retiree health benefits is likely to be the employer because the transaction allows the
employer to terminate both the legal liability for its retiree medical benefits and the
accounting obligations associated with that liability.
Retiree Considerations
When a group of retirees believes it has a legal right to lifetime health benefits and files
a class action lawsuit to stop their employer from terminating or substantially reducing
their health benefits, they are not likely to be completely satisfied by a settlement of that
litigation that allows their employer to walk away from future liabilities for retiree medical
benefits, even after paying a considerable amount of money to do so.
This is
particularly true since under the existing settlements, financially troubled employers
often pay the VEBA less than the full projected amount that the future retiree benefits
would cost.
Why retirees would agree to let the employer off the hook is a relevant question to
address. Even though agreeing to the establishment of a stand-alone VEBA which will
assume the responsibility of paying retiree benefits in the future is hardly a risk-free
proposition, it does have some positive features.
First, the transaction eliminates the risk that the company will be able to abrogate its
retiree liabilities entirely in bankruptcy. In most of the situations in which stand-alone
VEBAs have been established, there is a real risk that the employer could face
bankruptcy in the future. At the very least, the company’s future financial status is likely
to be uncertain.
Another key factor for retirees is that the assets the employer has contributed to the
VEBA will be permanently shielded from the reach of the employer’s creditors should an
employer bankruptcy occur in the future. Since the current source of funding for most
retiree medical benefits is the employer’s general assets, establishing a VEBA creates a
stable and protected, though limited, source of assets to pay benefits.
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Further, no longer will the employer control benefit design changes or be able to shift costs
to retirees. In fact, under some VEBA governance structures, retirees may have a say in
future benefit changes themselves. Based on the way that the stand alone VEBAs have
generally been set up, the need for future benefit changes will be decided by committees of
individuals independent of their former employer whose duty of loyalty to retirees and
commitment to keep the VEBA solvent will be the only drivers of their decisions.39
But, as previously noted, VEBAs are not a panacea for retirees. Many of these trusts start
out underfunded. If employers are in financial difficulty, the parties may agree to accept an
amount in required employer contributions that they know even at the outset may not be
sufficient to fully cover projected liabilities. In addition, to the extent that the employer
contribution consists of employer stock or other employer securities, given the current
economic downturn, the VEBA may find that those assets are far less valuable than
originally projected. So there is clearly a risk that the VEBA may run out of money before all
retiree liabilities are satisfied or before all early retirees are eligible for Medicare.40 The
nature and timing of contributions is critical. This is a particular worry if the only source of
contribution is a one-time payment by the employer with no supplemental payments or no
ongoing source of assets to pay benefits if times get tough.
Moreover, because the time horizon for the VEBA’s payment obligations may be difficult to
predict, investments may have to be more aggressively managed than traditional pension
plans do because a VEBA’s cash flow needs are quite different. So it is important to select
investment advisors who understand the liquidity needs of a VEBA and can devise an
investment strategy that will match performance with fiscal reality. Thinking and worrying
about these issues may be a new experience for retirees, especially those who might now
sit on the committee charged with oversight of the VEBA.
And of course, VEBAs are no more immune than other health plans from the uncertainty
of future medical costs, so the risk of guessing wrong on the effect of medical inflation
on plan costs is enormous.
The bottom line for retirees who settle their lawsuits by agreeing to a stand-alone VEBA
is that while they may be better off by exchanging a totally unfunded employer benefit
promise for a funded trust, secure even through an employer bankruptcy, as a practical
matter, they may simply be replacing one set of uncertainties for another.
Union Considerations
Maintaining and strengthening health insurance coverage for active workers and
retirees has been one of labor’s most difficult challenges in the past decade. Although
retiree benefits are not a mandatory subject of bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act, for many labor unions preserving retiree benefits has been the linchpin of
their ability to maintain generational solidarity among their members and an important
way to demonstrate the value of union membership. But success at the bargaining
table is not easily achieved and always comes at a price.
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For the union, then, the appeal of allowing an employer to terminate its existing legal
obligation for retiree health benefits and shift its liability to a stand-alone VEBA, even
one in which the union may be able to exercise a greater degree of control than before
over benefits, may not be immediately obvious. Perhaps not surprisingly, some unions
have rather reluctantly and somewhat belatedly (at least compared to employers) been
willing to agree to these arrangements.
Removing one of the most contentious issues from future bargaining sessions has
some appeal for unions, but the tradeoffs and consequences of such a deal can be
enormous. Even if the union is not technically responsible for running the VEBA
because the governing structure entrusts that legal obligation to a committee or board
on which representatives of the union may serve (but may not control), the retirees will
look to the union, and potentially blame the union, if problems occur.
Still, some unions are willing to take the risk because they believe that the marketplace
challenges for employers are such that the only way they can assure that retirees will
continue to enjoy health benefits similar to those they have had in the past is to assume
the responsibility either by directly running the VEBA themselves or indirectly entrusting
the retirees’ future benefits to a board or committee of carefully selected independent
experts who will share the union’s view that the retirees must be protected.
The bottom line for the unions is there may be no other way to maintain the hard-fought
retiree health benefits they have been able to negotiate than to work with employers to
find a new and different way to assure these promises will be kept.

VEBA Governance: A Critical Element
One feature of the new generation of stand-alone VEBAs that distinguishes them from
the VEBAs of the past is their governance structure.
As previously noted, some employers use VEBA trusts to fund ongoing medical costs
Multiemployer health and welfare plans also use VEBAs to fund their ongoing health
benefits. In each case, the plan sponsor governs the plan and its administration. Even
in the case of a multiemployer plan where the Taft-Hartley Act requires the plan to be
governed by a board of trustees with equal representation of labor and management
and the board is considered the plan sponsor under ERISA, governance typically is
internal to the union and the sponsoring employers.
In contrast, when the plan sponsor intends to transfer its retiree medical liabilities to the
VEBA, in order to be able to show that it has terminated any future legal liability for
paying benefits and future accounting liability for the obligations those benefits
represent, the plan sponsor must make a clean break from any maintenance or
administration of future benefits. If the employer continues to be involved on the
governing board of the new VEBA, arguably termination of legal and accounting liability
has not occurred. Therefore, most stand-alone VEBAs are likely to have no employer
involvement in their governance structure.
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Although it is difficult to determine how many stand-alone VEBAs exist based on
publicly available data, some limited information is available that may shed light on the
governance structure of a sample of them.
According to a recent study of 25 stand-alone retiree health VEBAs by the Segal
Company, the composition of the boards of trustees or administrative committees
running the VEBAs varies considerably.41 Not surprisingly, the study reported that most
governing boards have no company representatives at all. Just one of the 25 VEBAs in
the Segal study has solely company trustees. Five VEBAs have both union and
company trustees (the classic structure of multiemployer plans). Seven of the surveyed
VEBAs have only retiree trustees, six have boards of retiree and union trustees and four
have retiree, union and independent trustees. Two have boards with only union and
independent trustees.42 Although nearly half of the VEBAs in the study were small (i.e.,
fewer than 5,000 participants), six had more than 10,000 participants and two had more
than 100,000 participants.43

Public Sector VEBAs
Although less common than their private sector counterparts, VEBAs and other trusts
have begun to take on importance as state and local governments grapple with new
accounting standards issued by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
in 2004. GASB is a sister agency to the Financial Accounting Standards Board and its
2004 Standard 45 changed the way that public entities must account for their other
post-employment benefits (OPEB) liabilities in a manner similar to the standards
applicable to private sector employers. These liabilities can include the costs of retiree
health, dental, vision care and life insurance benefits. OPEB liability must be actuarially
calculated and accrued during the working life of employees, recognized as a financial
obligation and then reported on the governmental employers’ financial statements.
To offset OPEB liabilities, state and local governments may prefund benefits using a
variety of tools.44 These can include VEBAs, government trusts established under
Section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code, and Section 401(h) accounts within a
defined benefit pension plan (this latter option is also available to private sector
employers). Some state and local governments have the authority to issue bonds
(either general obligation (GO) bonds or Certificate of Participation (COP) bonds).
Under GASB Statement 45, these bonds may also be used to offset OPEB liability.
In the public sector, some VEBAs have been funded with contributions representing the
proceeds of unused accrued sick leave.45 More recently, however, governments have
set up central trusts under Section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code into which
contributions for retiree medical benefits are made on an irrevocable basis. But finding
the cash for these contributions has not been easy.
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Long before OPEB liability was a problem, however, Oakland County, Michigan, began
prefunding its retiree health obligations. Over 20 years ago, the County set aside money
to pay for its benefit promises through an annual appropriation to an actuarially funded
VEBA. Recently, it began funding its remaining OPEB liability through the sales of
taxable Certificates of Participation (COP), rather than appropriations. These differ from
general obligation bonds because they are not backed by the full faith and credit of the
County. However, the County pledged the VEBA assets (now worth over $303 million)
as collateral for the bonds and pledged the interest on the VEBA investments to repay
the debt.46
Although this approach may not be feasible for many other public
employers, it is an interesting approach to consider.

Case Studies: What Can We Learn?
Three important components of a successful stand-alone VEBA are:
1.
2.
3.

Having the trust fully funded or as close to it as possible at the beginning;
Keeping the plan solvent through profitable investment of plan assets; and
Working with retirees to manage patient costs and outcomes.

The VEBA can only be successful if it is better at managing overall costs and care than
the employer was prior to the establishment of the VEBA. But that is a formidable task
and defining “success” in this context is difficult.
This section of the paper reviews three VEBA case studies to get a sense of how standalone VEBAs work. Each case study includes: (1) the reason the VEBA was
established; (2) implementation date of VEBA coverage; (3) the existing benefit
structure at the time and any changes in that structure that were required or prohibited
as part of the VEBA establishment; (4) the governance structure of the VEBA; and (5)
the source of funding. Although all of these VEBAs are relatively new, and none has a
long-term track record to examine, some preliminary observations can be drawn about
their prospects for meeting their goals.

Case Study #1 – The Dana Corporation
Dana is an example of a company that has established stand-alone VEBAs for both
union and non-union retirees. In addition, the union VEBAs involve two different unions.
The VEBA covering non-union retirees immediately changed its benefit delivery
structure, but that flexibility is not yet available to the union VEBAs. It will be interesting
to see how each of these VEBAs evolves and whether there will be much of a difference
over time between the VEBA covering Steelworker retirees and the one covering UAW
retirees.
Dana was a financially troubled automotive components manufacturer located in
Toledo, Ohio. The company filed for bankruptcy protection on March 3, 2006, had
sought bankruptcy court approval to terminate its three retiree medical plans, and on
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January 31, 2007 sought to cancel its collective bargaining agreements with the US
Steelworkers and the United Auto Workers. After negotiations, the company reached
agreement with representatives of its non-union retirees and both union groups to
establish three separate VEBAs and to allow it to terminate its obligation to provide
retiree medical benefits. The settlement agreement providing for the establishment of all
three VEBAs was approved by the Bankruptcy Court on August 1, 2007.
The settlement with the non-union retirees provided for the company to continue to pay
for retiree medical benefits through July 1, 2007. The Retiree Committee has the
authority to create new health insurance plans once the VEBA assumes responsibility
for paying benefits so there is no requirement that the benefits remain the same, and
the Retirees Committee has already altered the benefit options for the non-union
retirees. Non-Medicare-eligible retirees now are covered under a preferred provider
organization (PPO); their coverage includes prescription drugs. However, Medicareeligible retirees have only supplemental medical coverage through the VEBA, and they
have the right to elect prescription drug coverage through a Medicare Prescription Drug
Plan offered by the VEBA.
The settlement agreement with the two union groups locks in the current benefits for a
period of time, but then allows modifications to keep the trust solvent.
No information could be found on the public record about the number of members of the
Retiree Committee for the VEBA covering non-union retirees.
The union VEBAs are governed by a seven-member board: four public members who
must be independent experts and three members appointed by the union. No member
of the board can be a current or former official, director, or salaried employee of Dana
Corporation. Members serve for life or until death, incapacity, resignation or removal.
The chair is selected by the members of the committee.
The company agreed to make a one-time payment of $78 in cash million to the nonunion retirees VEBA.
Dana agreed to pay $700 million in cash and $80 million in common stock of the
reorganized company to the union VEBA. An independent fiduciary will have control
over the employer securities within the VEBAs. Under the settlement agreement, the
unions and the company could negotiate an arrangement in which compensation that
would otherwise go to active workers be contributed to the VEBA.

Case Study # 2 – the Big Three Auto Companies (GM/Ford/Chrysler VEBAs)
The biggest and most complicated VEBA structure thus far involves the automobile
companies. These are also the companies that have received the most intense media
scrutiny. How the deteriorating financial position of the companies will affect the funding
commitments they have made to the union and retirees must be carefully monitored. If
the condition in the recent loan agreements between the Bush Treasury Department
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and GM and Chrysler continues in force and at least half the future VEBA payments are
required to be in employer securities rather than cash, the protections for retirees
embodied in the settlement agreement may be undermined if the value of the
companies continues to erode.
The auto companies agreed to establish VEBAs as part of national contract negotiations
with the UAW in 2007. As is often the case in these types of complex negotiations, the
agreement reached by the parties was in effect memorialized through the filling of
lawsuits by the retirees and the union involving each company and then court approval
of the respective settlements. The GM and Chrysler settlements were approved by the
district courts in 2008; the Ford settlement was approved in August 2008. No appeals to
these settlement decisions were filed, so the judgment in each district court approving
the settlements was final.
Under the agreements, a single VEBA covering retirees of all three companies was to
be established. The new VEBA will not be operational for about two years, or, if later,
until all the governmental approvals are received. There are a number of reasons for
the parties’ decision to delay implementation, including the expected time they knew it
would take to secure final approval of the settlement through litigation, the transition
time needed to get the administrative and investment infrastructure in place to operate a
VEBA trust of this size, and the long lead time necessary to secure the necessary
government approvals, including Department of Labor approvals for the contributions of
various types of employer securities which might otherwise be prohibited under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) approval needed to assure that the transfer of retiree
medical obligations is treated as a “settlement” of each of the company’s OPEB liability.
Thus the target date for the changeover of liabilities is January 2010.
The benefit levels and structures for the new plan will initially be governed by the
settlement agreement negotiated in the 2006 lawsuit brought by the UAW and a class of
retirees (“the Henry case”).47 After 2012, however, the committee has some discretion
to adjust benefits.
The current implementation plan calls for the auto companies’ VEBA to be governed by
an 11-person committee which will oversee the trust administration and investments for
all three groups of company retirees. However, each group of retirees will have its own
separate subaccount under the trust and its own separate plan so that there will be no
financial cross-subsidization of one group of company retirees by another. The VEBA
trustees have already been appointed by the courts as part of the settlement
agreement. Under the agreement, the UAW appointed five members of the committee
and all parties agreed on the six independent public members. An interesting feature of
the governance structure is a requirement in each settlement agreement that any
successful motion must pass with at least one vote from each group.48
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General Motors agreed to contribute approximately $35 billion to fund the VEBA. Its
initial contribution will be $24.1 billion, and will pay an additional $5.4 billion to cover
retirees’ health care costs until the VEBA is expected to take over in January 2010. The
company will also make up to 20 additional payments of $165 million each (to a
maximum of $1.6 billion) anytime the trust’s level is actuarially insufficient to provide
benefits for at least 25 years. GM is also required to pay the VEBA cash interest on a
$4.37 billion convertible note which the VEBA’s trustee may convert to GM stock.
Active workers are also required to contribute four cents per quarter to the VEBA.
Ford agreed to contribute a combination of $13.2 billion in cash and notes.
Contributions will include $2.7 billion in cash, $3.8 billion from an existing VEBA, a $3.3
billion note convertible into about 363 million new shares of Ford stock, a $3 billion
second lien term note and $400 million in deferred payments. Ford said it expects to
realize about $1 billion a year in net cash flow benefit once the VEBA becomes
operational, including a $1.6 billion per year offset by VEBA contributions.
Because Chrysler is not a publicly traded company, not much information regarding its
funding obligations is available. However, according to one source, Chrysler is
obligated to contribute $11 billion to the VEBA – $7.1 billion in cash, up to 20 additional
payments of $50 million in cash, and $1.2 billion in other forms of payment and common
stock warrants.49
Since the time the district courts approved the settlement agreement, two of the
companies, GM and Chrysler, have sought federal assistance based on their
deteriorating financial condition. In late December 2008, the Bush Administration
reached an agreement to extend federal loans to the auto makers and contracts
between GM and Chrysler and the Treasury Department were signed that contained
various targets and goals for the companies to meet in order to continue to qualify for
federal assistance. The only term of these loan agreements that appears to directly
impact the promised VEBA funding is a provision that requires each company to make
at least half of each required contribution to the VEBA in the form of employer securities
rather than cash. Given the fact that this requirement directly conflicts with ERISA
(contributions of employer securities under these circumstances are prohibited unless
the Department of Labor grants an exemption prior to the contribution), it is unclear how
this condition will be enforced without additional action by the Department of Labor.
Moreover, since all the terms and conditions of the loan agreement are subject to
review and modification, now that the Obama Administration is in office, it is possible
that changes to the loan agreements may be adopted that may affect the companies’
obligations to the VEBA.

15

Case Study # 3 – AK Steel
AK Steel is one of the few companies where the level of agreed upon contributions to
the VEBA matches the projected liability for promised benefits. The careful way in
which the VEBA was negotiated and benefit levels were designed may give this VEBA a
reasonable chance of successfully achieving its goals.
After the bargaining agreement between AK Steel Corp. of West Chester, Ohio and the
Armco Employees Independent Federation, Inc. expired on February 28, 2006 and the
parties could not reach agreement, the union voted to strike. However, on March 1,
2006, the company locked out the union. On June 1, 2006, AK Steel announced it was
terminating its retiree health plan effective October 1, 2006 and implementing a new
plan with monthly premiums and reduced benefits. A class action lawsuit was filed by a
group of retirees in July 2006 to block the company from implementing the new health
plan and the court temporarily enjoined the company from doing so.
The company and the retirees settled the lawsuit in October 2007. Under the
settlement, the company agreed to establish a VEBA for the 4,600 retirees from its
Middletown, Ohio production plant. The court approved the settlement on February 21,
2008 and the VEBA was immediately established.
The new benefit plan for retirees was established as part of the settlement agreement.
According to the court, the actuarial consulting firm hired by the plaintiffs “determined
the general level of benefits that these payments [by the company] would sustain over
the lifetimes of the retirees, and a specific schedule of benefits was developed.”50 This
is not typically the way benefits are established. Usually the settlement agreement
specifies that the current benefits (or some form of modified benefits) will continue for a
period of time or discretion is granted to the VEBA committee to establish the plan of
benefits.
The VEBA is governed by five trustees – three members of the retiree class and two
public trustees.
The company agreed to contribute $663 million over four years to the VEBA. The
company will make an initial payment of $468 million and three subsequent annual
contributions of $65 million each. Under the actuarial projections, the AK Steel trust is
expected to be fully funded for 40-50 years.

Preliminary Conclusions from the Case Studies
Although it is far too early to draw meaningful conclusions from the experiences of the
three VEBAs profiled above, they reflect an interesting continuum of possible outcomes.
The Big Three Automakers VEBAs are clearly the most ambitious and complicated of the
three case studies, and there are clear cost advantages to be gained by administering them
as a single entity. However, the trustees’ ability to adjust and modernize the benefit delivery
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structure appears to be constrained because benefits in the future are linked to the benefit
structure that was negotiated in 2005 (at least until 2012). But since the long-run fiscal
health of the auto companies is unclear, their ability to fund the commitments they made
under the settlement agreement is also up in the air.
Each of these VEBAs is designed to be self-sustaining for a considerable period of time,
with the AK Steel VEBA appearing to be the most fully funded from the beginning
because its plan benefits were carefully and conservatively planned with the available
funding in mind. Yet the provisions in the settlement agreements for GM, Ford and
Chrysler that require the companies to make additional contributions if the trust assets
falls below the level necessary to maintain sufficiency for 25 years could be an
important protection if the auto companies’ financial health turns around sufficiently to
allow them to honor their funding commitments to the VEBA.
In many respects, Dana’s VEBAs will face the most daunting sustainability challenge
since they will have to assure that the one-time cash infusion is sufficient to carry it
through the years. But the Dana retirees had the most to lose if no agreement was
reached since the company was already in bankruptcy and the retirees risked getting
nothing at all.
All three VEBAs will face unique challenges and it is too early to tell if they will succeed.

Implications and Questions for the Future
The past few years have seen a record number of stand-alone VEBAs established -- all
designed to transfer retiree medical liabilities from struggling companies to brand new
entities. What will their record of success be?
In the short term, it will be interesting to see if these VEBAs will be able to accomplish
this transition from the prior employer plan to a new plan of benefits in a relatively
smooth way. The goal of creating a seamless transition for retirees is only attainable
with the cooperation and support of the prior plan administration staff and the new
committee members responsible for future plan administration tasks. Many retirees
may be unhappy at the prospect of losing the “security” of having their former employer
provide their medical benefits. It may take time to convince them that the new
arrangement is an improvement (or at least not worse than continuing to have the
employer responsible for providing coverage).
In some cases, unions have negotiated the ability to provide additional funding streams
for the VEBA through contributions by active workers. However, convincing the active
workers to divert part of the negotiated salary increases to fund the VEBA may not
necessarily be an easy task. The UAW’s experience with its so-called “Baby VEBAs”
was a positive one – active workers were willing to defer significant amounts of wages
and cost-of-living adjustments to contribute to those VEBAs. But given the current
economic downturn, it is unclear whether workers will continue to do so or whether the
immediate need for higher wages will outweigh the notion of protecting future retiree
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medical benefits. If the severe market downturn that has depressed investment results
in 2008 and 2009 forces VEBA trustees to reduce the benefits or increase out-of-pocket
costs, it is unclear how the union will be able to convince active workers to support the
VEBA. And yet, without the possibility of additional revenue if necessary beyond the
employer’s one-time cash contribution, VEBA trustees may face an insurmountable
crunch in the future if they are unsuccessful in controlling costs.
Over the long-term, if the benefit promises are not sustained, retirees may shift their
displeasure with their employers to the union or the VEBA trustees when faced with
benefit cuts or higher costs from the VEBA.
Moreover, it will be interesting to see whether more private sector employers,
particularly in the non-bargained context, decide to establish VEBAs rather than
terminate their retiree health plans entirely. Again given the current severe economic
downturn, it will be increasingly difficult for employers faced with the need to implement
significant layoffs or plant shutdowns to maintain retiree medical benefits at all.
Public sector employers are facing similar challenges in adjusting to their new
accounting liabilities. Will state and local governments turn to irrevocable trusts, such as
VEBAs, as they cope with these liabilities? And will governments make greater use of
bond issues to raise the cash needed to offset their OPEB liability?
At least some policymakers are looking closely at these new VEBAs to determine
whether their existence will affect longer-term health and labor market policy
challenges, such as the upcoming health care reform debate.51 Most of the current
health care reform proposals are directed at the under-65 population. The employers
and unions that have been the most open to VEBA establishment – steel and auto and
related industries – all have huge legacy cost concerns and all have to deal with large
numbers of early retirees. The biggest expense for the VEBAs (just as it is for
employers) is providing health care for this younger retiree group. Presumably there will
be significant political pressure to expand health care reform to address these concerns
rather than focus only on active workers.
Although existing VEBAs were certainly helped financially by the addition of prescription
drug coverage to Medicare, given the current financial crisis and growing deficit, it may
not be realistic to expect any additional relief through even a modest Medicare
expansion. Yet further changes to Medicare, especially any attempt to change (either
reduce or increase) the eligibility age for Medicare, may significantly affect the ability of
VEBAs to provide benefits in the future.
Employers, unions and retiree that have supported stand-alone VEBAs are betting that
this new approach will be just as good, if not better, at controlling costs and delivering
quality health care than the employer-sponsored plans of the past. Are the trustees of
these new VEBAs up to the challenge or can they survive? By engaging retirees
covered by the plans and the unions that have negotiated them in the actual decisionmaking necessary to keep the plans viable, policymakers may find that the long-time
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goal of creating a more engaged consumer/patient is closer to achievement. While
everyone involved in the health care system searches for the key to controlling costs,
one intriguing question is whether VEBAs can provide a viable structure for
demonstrating whether it is in fact true that focusing on prevention, chronic disease
management and lifestyle changes can affect the cost of providing health care, and then
convincing consumers of this proposition. The proponents of this new approach are
hoping it can do so, since stand-alone VEBAs may be the last best hope of salvaging
retiree medical benefits for the remaining retirees still fortunate to have them – but only
time will tell.
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